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BATSON'S INVIDIOUS LEGACY: DISCRIMINATORY
JUROR EXCLUSION AND THE "INTUITIVE"
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
I
INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process and equal
protection of the laws to all citizens regardless of race. Consistent
with this guarantee, an attorney may not exclude a potential juror
from the venire panel based solely upon the juror's race. I Such an
exclusion violates the constitutional rights of both the litigant and
the excluded juror.2
Potential jurors, also known as venire persons, may be excluded
from a jury through either peremptory challenges or challenges for
cause. A peremptory challenge is " [t]he right to challenge a juror
without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the chal-
lenge."3 It differs from a "challenge for cause," which requires a
judicial finding that there is a "narrowly specified, provable and le-
gally cognizable basis of [a juror's] partiality."'4 In most jurisdic-
tions, each party to a civil or criminal action has a specified number
I See infra notes 72-147 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
3 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990). See generally JON M. VAN DYKE,
JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMrrMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS
139-75 (1977). While historically recognized to assume a fair trial, peremptory chal-
lenges are not a constitutional right. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
4 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. Challenges for cause are unlimited, but are frequently
denied by trial courts because of the difficulty in establishing a juror's bias during voir
dire or jury selection. Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27
STAN. L. REV. 545, 549-51 (1975). Babcock also noted that cause challenges could not
"effectively screen those who share biases and prejudices common to a racial or ethnic
group" unless those jurors admit their biases. Id. at 554.
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1886), detailed typical reasons that permit an excuse
for cause:
Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged
to be injured by the offence charged, or on whose complaint the prosecu-
tion was instituted, or to the defendant; .. . Standing in the relation of
guardian and ward, attorney and client, master and servant, or landlord
and tenant, or being a member of the family of the defendant, or of the
person alleged to be injured by the offence charged, or on whose com-
plaint the prosecution was instituted, or in his employment on wages....
Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief that the
prisoner is guilty or not guilty of the offence charged.
Id. at 433.
In addition to the traditional grounds listed above, many states recognize untradi-
tional causes for challenge:
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of peremptory challenges. In a civil suit in federal court, each party
is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 5 In a federal criminal
trial, however, the number of peremptory challenges varies with the
nature of the offense. 6
Acknowledging that peremptory challenges can mask racism in
the courtroom, the United States Supreme Court requires that both
the prosecutor and the defense counsel in a criminal trial offer race-
neutral reasons for excluding jurors should either side establish a
prima facie case of discrimination injury selection. 7 The Court has
recently applied the same constitutional protection to the discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges in civil trials.8 Although this
civil extension of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests that the
Court regards the eradication of discrimination from the courtroom
as a fundamental constitutional mandate, another recent Supreme
Court case signifies a retreat from this notion.9 Despite the plethora
of recent Supreme Court cases on peremptory challenges, the Court
has failed to provide lower federal courts with practical guidance for
analyzing the various reasons an attorney might submit as "race-
neutral."10
An attorney's proffered reasons for a peremptory challenge
may be divided into those based on "hard-data" and those based on
"soft-data." For the purposes of this Note, the term "hard-data"
denotes reasons that are based on objectively verifiable juror infor-
mation supplied through a questionnaire or voir dire. Examples of
hard-data about a juror include knowledge of the defendant, nature
of employment, level of education, location of residence, prior in-
Some statutes also list additional grounds, such as: that he has served as a
juror in the preceding year... ; that he is or has been engaged in carry-
ing on a business in violation of the law, where the defendant is indicted
for a like offense; that he has been indicted within 12 months for a felony
or an offense of the same character as that with which the defendant is
charged; that he is a party to a suit pending in that court at that term ....
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL By JURY 69 (ABA 1968).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
6 See infra note 30.
7 See infra notes 72-147 and accompanying text; see also infra note 121.
8 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); see infra notes 118-
47 and accompanying text. The Court's expansion of equal protection in the peremp-
tory challenge context suggests that voir dire, already a lengthy process, will consume
more of the court's resources. An eleven county study in New York, a jurisdiction that
retains attorney-conducted voir dire, discovered that voir dire took longer than the trial
itself in 20%o of the 462 cases studied by the New York Governor's Commission on
Administration ofJustice. The average voir dire took 12.7 hours, which comprised 40%o
of the time of the entire case. Marcia Chambers, Who Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or
Judges?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1983, at B4.
9 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991) (upholding peremptory chal-
lenges allegedly based on juror demeanor and lack of deference to court translator); see
infra notes 160-89 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 185-209 and accompanying text.
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volvement with the law, or previous participation on a jury."I By
contrast, the term soft-data denotes reasons that are based on
purely subjective information or unverifiable data. The consum-
mate example of a soft-data reason is an attorney's "intuition."
Other examples of soft-data include body language, dress, hairstyle,
speech dialect, or tone of voice. 12 While hard-data exclusions are
often appropriate, soft-data exclusions may permit a lawyer to dis-
criminate against both the opposing party and the venire person. 13
The central thesis of this Note is that, once a party has estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection, the only
allowable peremptory challenges are those hard-data exclusions that
evince a "substantial nexus" between a juror's statements and the
facts of the case.14 To support this argument, this Note first surveys
the history of peremptory challenges from English to United States
law, including four important United States Supreme Court per-
emptory challenge cases. 15 The analysis of these cases shows that
eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom has remained
a fundamental constitutional mandate. Second, this Note analyzes
seventy-six federal circuit court cases decided since 1986.16 In only
three of these cases did courts fail to accept the attorneys' proffered
reasons for peremptory challenges. Third, this Note proposes that
federal courts should disallow exclusions based on soft-data rea-
sons. They should also formulate an enforceable and viable test for
objective hard-data reasons for exclusion.' 7 All lawyers in civil and
criminal trials in federal courts would then be required to state and
support such a reason only after opposing counsel has established a
prima facie case of discriminatory juror exclusion. These proposals
would preserve the traditional practice of the peremptory challenge,
conform logically to precedent, and assist all federal courts in as-
sessing a suspect peremptory challenge. Criticism of this proposal
is also addressed. Finally, this Note applies the proposed hard-data
test for peremptory challenges to a recent United States Supreme
Court case and to other federal circuit court cases. 18
'' Id.
12 Id.
13 See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
14 See infra part IV.
15 See infra part II.
16 See infra part III.B.
17 See infra part IV.
18 See infra part V.
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II
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
A. Early English Practice
A defendant in medieval England 9 could exercise thirty-five
peremptory challenges in all trials for felonies at common law.20
Originally, the prosecutor could challenge any number of jurors
without cause, which was said to produce "infinite delayes and dan-
ger."' 21 Because of these problems, the Ordinance for Inquests pro-
vided that if "they that sue for the King will challenge any.. .Jurors,
they shall assign ... a Cause certain." 22 Courts construed the stat-
ute as allowing the prosecution to direct any juror, after question-
ing, to "stand aside" until the entire venire panel had been
examined and the defendant had exercised his challenges. The
Crown had to show cause with respect to jurors recalled only if
there was a deficiency ofjurors.23 The settled law of England allows
peremptory challenges on both sides.24
19 England was not the first country to allow peremptory challenges. The Roman
Lex Servilia (B.C. 104) established that each party to an action could propose 100judices.
Each side could then reject 50 on the list of the other, and 100 would remain to try the
alleged crime. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
(citing J. PETTINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACTICE OF JURIES AMONG THE
GREEKS AND ROMANS 115, 135 (1769)).
20 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). Justice White wrote that:
It was thought that peremptory challenges were allowed at common
law in capital felonies only. Thus Blackstone states: "[I]n criminal cases,
or at least in capital ones, there is, infavorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner
an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of
jurors, without showing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory chal-
lenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for
which our English laws are justly famous."
Ia at 212 n.9 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809)). Justice
White also notes that Blackstone's statement is "not far amiss, since most felonies were
generally punishable by death." Id. (citing 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 98 (15th ed.
1809)).
21 Id. at 212-13 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSITUTES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 156 (14th ed. 1791)). Justice White notes that "[t]he defendant's
right remained unchallenged until 22 Hen. 8, c.14, § 6 (1530); 25 Hen. 8 c.3 (1533),
when the number was limited to 20 in all cases except high treason." Id. at 213 n.10. See
generally JOHN PROFFAT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 156 (1877).
22 Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 (quoting 33 Edw. 1, Star. 4 (1305)).
23 Id. at 213. "The number ofjurors called was in the discretion of the court and it
is reported that the right to stand aside was exercised liberally." Id. at 213 n. 11 (citing
JOHN PROFFAT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 160 (1877)). "All attempts to limit or
abolish the Crown's right were rejected." Id. (citing Regina v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129
(1839); O'Coigly's Case, 29 How. St. Tr. 1191, 1231; 1 THOMPSON, TRIALS § 49 (2d ed.
1912); BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS INJURY TRIALS § 69 (1949)).
24 Swain, 380 U.S. at 213. ChiefJustice Burger notes that "[i]t remains the law of
England today, except the number the defendant may now exercise is seven." Id. at 213
n.12. "The actual use of challenges by either side has been rare, for at least a century,
but the continued availability of the right is considered important." Id. (citing 1 SIR
JAMES F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 303 (1883); PATRICK B. DEv-
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B. Peremptory Challenges in the New World
In the Act of 1790,25 the United States Congress established
that defendants could exercise thirty-five peremptory challenges in
trials for treason and twenty in trials for other felonies punishable
by death.26 For offenses not covered by the 1790 Act, both the de-
fendant and the government apparently had the right of peremptory
challenge, although the source of this right was not clear.27 Later,
in capital and treason cases, a federal statute allowed the govern-
ment five peremptory challenges and the defendant twenty.28 In
other cases, when the defendant had a right to ten peremptory chal-
lenges, the government was limited to two. 29 Subsequent enact-
ments gave the government and the defendant the same number of
challenges in capital crimes. In cases when the crime was punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment, however, the government
had six challenges and the defendant ten.30
LIN, TRIAL BYJURY 29-37 (1956); PENDLETON HOWARD, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN ENGLAND: A
STUDY IN LAW ADMINISTRATION 362-64 (1931)).
25 1 Stat. 99 (1790).
26 Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 (citing 1 Stat. 119 (1790)).
27 Id.
The right of challenge was a privilege highly esteemed, and anxiously
guarded, at the common law; and it cannot be doubted, but that at the
common law, a prisoner is entitled, on a capital charge, to challenge per-
emptorily, thirty-five of the jurors. If, therefore, the act of congress has
substituted no other rule... the common law rule must be pursued.
Id at 214 n.13 (quoting United States v.Johns, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 412, 414 (1806)); see also
United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480 (1827) (asserting that the Crown's
power to stand aside was a part of the common law inherited from the English); United
States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856) (holding that federal statutes afford-
ing the defendant the right of peremptory challenge did not incorporate the govern-
ment's right to stand aside but that the government could do this by virtue of the 1840
Act, 5 Stat. 394, empowering the federal courts to adopt the state practice in regard to
selection and impaneling ofjuries).
28 Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15 (citing 13 Stat. 500 (1865)). A few years later Congress
extended the defendant's right to ten challenges in all noncapital felony cases, and the
government's to three. Congress also extended the right to misdemeanor and civil
cases, with each party entitled to three. 17 Stat. 282 (1872).
29 Swain, 380 U.S. at 214-15.
30 Id. at 215 (citing 36 Stat. 1166 § 287 (1911) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1870
(1988)) (providing that where the offense is a capital offense or treason, the defendant is
entitled to twenty peremptory challenges and the United States to six; in all other felony
trials, the defendant has ten, and the United States has six)); see also FED. R. CRIM. P.
24(b):
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20
peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, the government is entitled to 6 peremptory
challenges and the defendant or defendants jointly to 10 peremptory
challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for not
more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled is entitled to 3
peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court
may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit
them to be exercised separately or jointly.
340 [Vol. 78:336
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C. The United States Supreme Court on Peremptory
Challenges
1. Strauder v. West Virginia (1879)31
The first peremptory challenge case before the United States
Supreme Court was not about peremptory challenges per se, but
instead concerned a jury selection statute. In Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, the Court invalidated a West Virginia statute that completely
barred African-Americans from jury service.32
Strauder was an African-American who had been indicted,
tried, and convicted by an all-white jury in a West Virginia county
court.3 3 At his trial, Strauder petitioned to remove the case to fed-
eral court, moved to quash the venire and to arrest the judgment,
and made several other motions protesting the exclusion of African-
Americans from thejury.3 4 He claimed that the statute limiting jury
service to white men violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause because it denied him the same privilege white
defendants enjoyed-trial before a jury from which one's racial
peers had not been excluded.3 5 The state court denied all of
Strauder's motions.3 6
On writ of error, the United States Supreme Court reversed3 7
and declared West Virginia's jury statute unconstitutional.38 Apply-
ing the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment, the Court asserted
that West Virginia's discriminatory jury selection statute was pre-
cisely the type of system the Amendment prohibited.3 9 The Court
decided that, in principle, the Fourteenth Amendment must be con-
The Court held that the government's right to stand aside survived early statutes giving
the government peremptory challenges. Sawyer v. United States, 202 U.S. 150 (1906).
31 100 U.S. 303 (1879). The Batson Court later remarked that Strauder "laid the
foundation for the Court's unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in the
procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors are drawn." Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
32 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
33 Id. at 304.
34 Id- at 304-05.
35 IE at 304.
36 Id. at 304-05.
37 IM at 312.
38 id at 310.
39 Id. at 308.
And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to
a trial for his life by ajury drawn from a panel from which the State has
expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, how-
ever well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal
protection?
Id. at 309.
1993]
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strued liberally and that, in practice, the West Virginia statute bla-
tantly discriminated against African-Americans. 40
Justice Strong's majority opinion laid the doctrinal foundation
for all future challenges to discriminatory jury selection proce-
dures. 4 1 He declared that the "true spirit and meaning" 42 of the
Reconstruction Amendments "cannot be understood without keep-
ing in view the history of the times when they were adopted. '43 The
Fourteenth Amendment, he wrote, "was designed to assure the
colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law
are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection
of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should
be denied by the States."'44 The Court asserted that statutes like
West Virginia's stimulate "that race prejudice which is an impedi-
ment to securing to individuals of the [African-American] race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. '45 Later
peremptory challenge cases affirmed Justice Strong's assertion that
the Reconstruction Amendments protected the civil rights of Afri-
can-Americans .46
2. Swain v. Alabama (1965)47
The Court's 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama48 consciously at-
tempted to reconcile the ancient trial practice of peremptory chal-
40 Id. at 307-09.
41 Strong wrote:
[Ihe law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white;
that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the
laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protec-
tion the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall
be made against them by law because of their color[.]
Id. at 307.
42 Id. at 306.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 308.
46 Id. at 306 (citing The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
47 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
48 Between Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), the Court decided several important jury selection cases, none of
which directly addressed peremptory challenges. In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880), the Court invalidated the action of state officers whose job it was to secure jurors
in a non-discriminatory fashion. In Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900), the Court
extended equal protection to cases where African-Americans had been excluded from
grandjuries. In Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1934), the Court again expanded
equal protection to encompass situations where the total exclusion of African-Americans
from the venire panel denied African-American defendants the opportunity to have a
petit jury that was not tainted by prohibited exclusion. The Court also prevented states
from placing restrictions on the number of African-Americans who could sit on a grand
jury. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). Finally, in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 480 (1954), the Court coined the phrase "rule of exclusion" to describe the pattern
of proof required to find unlawful discrimination in jury cases. A prima facie case of
[Vol. 78:336
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lenge with the Fourteenth Amendment.49 In Swain, the Court
upheld a prosecutor's peremptory challenges because the defendant
failed to provide sufficient evidence of discrimination. 50
Swain, an African-American, was indicted and convicted of rape
in the Circuit Court of Talladega County, Alabama. An all-white
jury sentenced him to death.5 ' Alleging invidious discrimination, he
moved to quash the indictment, to strike the jury venire, and to de-
clare void the petit jury chosen in the case.52 The motions were
denied, 53 and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the convic-
tion. 54 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari55 to de-
cide whether the defendant's evidence established a prima facie case
of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Swain showed that no African-American had served on a petit jury
since 1950, but that an average of six to seven African-Americans
had been called for petit jury venires. 57 Affirming the Alabama
Supreme Court,58 the Court held that the evidence was insufficient
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 59
Acknowledging that an African-American is not entitled to a
jury composed of members of his own race, the Court reiterated the
Strauder principle that "[]urymen should be selected as individuals,
on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as members of a
race." 60 Justice White, writing for the majority, then addressed the
defendant's argument that the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges to remove African-Americans from the jury violated the
Equal Protection Clause. 6 1 Stating that the peremptory challenge
discrimination arose where, in an area of substantial African-American population, no
African-Americans were summoned to serve during a significant period of time.
49 The Court surveyed the history of the peremptory challenge from English com-
mon law to twentieth-century America. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-22. Stating that the prac-
tice "has very old credentials," id. at 212, the Court also agreed that "if the State has not
seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protect-
ing the prosecutor may well be overcome." Id. at 224.
50 Id. at 209.
51 Id. at 205.
52 Id. at 203.
53 Id
54 Id
55 Swain v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 915 (1964).
56 Swain, 380 U.S. at 205-06.
57 Id. at 205.
58 Id. at 228.
59 Id. at 206. After considering the defendant's evidence that African-American
males constituted 26% of all males in Talladega County but only 10 to 15% of the petit
and grand jury venire panels drawn from the jury box since 1953, id at 205, Justice
White, writing for the majority, asserted that "[i]t is wholly obvious that Alabama has
not totally excluded a racial group from either grand or petit jury panels .... " Id. at
206.
60 Id at 204 (quoting Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950)).
61 Id. at 209-22.
1993]
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had "very old credentials," 62 White surveyed the history of the prac-
tice from medieval English practice to modem American usage. He
concluded that the "peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial
byjury." 63 Finally, White observed that if the State of Alabama had
exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans
in "case after case," such evidence might support an inference of an
equal protection violation.64
The Swain Court, however, found the defendant's evidence in-
sufficient to establish such a "case-after-case" inference. 65 The rec-
ord before the Court did not, "with any acceptable degree of clarity,
show when, how often, and under what circumstances the prosecu-
tor alone has been responsible for striking those Negroes who ap-
peared on petit jury panels in Talladega County." 66 In some cases
in that county, the defense attorney had also removed African-
American jurors from the venire or agreed with the prosecutor that
all African-American jurors should be challenged. In sum, the
Court held that Swain had failed to show that the prosecutor had
systematically challenged African-American venire persons.
To satisfy this test, Swain would have had to investigate several
factors over a number of cases: the race of persons tried in the par-
ticular jurisdiction; the racial composition of the venire panel and
the petit jury; and how both parties exercised their peremptory chal-
lenges. 67 The court records in some jurisdictions did not reflect the
jurors' race. Often voir dire proceedings were not transcribed. The
burden of such an investigation would have been insurmountable.68
62 Id. at 212.
63 Id. at 219. Despite Justice White's reverence for the peremptory challenge as an
intregral part of trial by jury, there is evidence that neither side in a criminal trial actu-
ally benefits from being allowed to challenge jurors. See generally Hans Zeisel & Shari S.
Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal
District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491 (1978). The authors studied three groups ofjurors:
peremptorily struck jurors, randomly selected jurors from the remainder of the venire,
and jurors chosen through voir dire. Id- at 492, 498. Analysis of the verdicts of these
three groups, which heard the same testimony and saw the same exhibits in twelve cases,
rebuts the presumption that peremptory challenges have some influence on the verdict,
as prosecutors failed to alter verdicts through peremptory challenges and defense coun-
sel performed "only slightly better" than their counterparts. Id at 492, 528.
64 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222-24.
65 Id. at 223-24.
66 Id. at 224.
67 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 n.17 (1986) (citing United States v. Pearson,
448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that testimony and notes of a prosecutor
concerning his use of peremptory challenges were insufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption that a good faith exercise of peremptory challenges had occurred)).
68 Id. (citing People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 767-68 (Cal. 1978) (holding that the
use of peremptory challenges to remove venire persons on the sole ground of group
bias violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights)).
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Thus, the Swain test imposed what was later called a "crippling bur-
den of proof" on a defendant. 69
Rather than focus on a defendant's burden of proof, the Swain
Court attempted to balance the Equal Protection Clause with the
tradition of the peremptory challenge. The Court reasoned that
"[the peremptory challenge] must be exercised with full freedom, or
it fails of its full purpose. '70 Yet the Court also recognized that
"case after case" racial exclusions would require Fourteenth
Amendment protection.71
3. Batson v. Kentucky (1986)72
Twenty-one years later, the Court asserted in Batson v. Kentucky
that the Swain test failed to balance these competing claims ade-
quately. 73 In addition to overruling74 and criticizing 75 Swain, Batson
established the current three-part test for analyzing a peremptory
challenge.76
69 Id. at 92. For a list of some of the unsuccessful cases that labored under the
Swain standard, see James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Ex-
cludefrom Jury Persons Belonging to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3D 14, 56-73 (1979).
For a list of articles criticizing Swain, see Robert W. Rodriquez, Comment, Batson v.
Kentucky, Equal Protection, the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, and the Discriminatory Use of
Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY LJ. 755, 763 n.50 (1988).
70 Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378
(1892)(holding that not allowing defendant to know whom the prosecution had chal-
lenged constituted substantial error)).
71 See supra note 64.
72 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
73 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
74 L. at 100 n.25.
75 l. at 92. Batson found the Swain test to require a "crippling burden of proof."
Id.; see McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (asserting that a
state may not use peremptory challenges to exclude African-American and Hispanic ju-
rors on the basis of their group affiliation), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 478 U.S.
1001 (1986).
76 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
Many have criticized the effectiveness of the Batson remedy. See, e.g., Albert W. Al-
schuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1989); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory
Challenges and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. GRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1988); David D. Hopper, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REV. 811, 811-41
(1988); Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection),
72 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (1987); Rodriguez, supra note 69; Developments in the Law-Race
and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472, 1581 (1988).
The Batson decision may be a microcosm for the American criminal justice system:
"If one wanted to understand how the American trial system for criminal cases came to
be the most expensive in the world, it would be difficult to find a better starting point
than Batson." William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky, Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient,
1987 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 155 (1987).
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Batson, an African-American, had been indicted in Kentucky on
charges of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 7 7
An all-white jury tried and convicted him in a Kentucky state
court.78 During the trial, the judge conducted voir dire of the venire
panel and excused certain jurors for cause. 79 The prosecutor then
used his peremptory challenges to strike all four African-Americans
from the venire.80 Before the jury was sworn, the defendant moved
to discharge the jury.81 Batson claimed that the prosecutor's re-
moval of the African-American venire persons violated his rights,
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to ajury drawn from
a cross section of the community. He also asserted that the exclu-
sion violated his rights, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to equal
protection under the laws.8 2 The trial judge did not expressly rule
on Batson's request for a hearing, but he did assert that the parties
could use their peremptory challenges to "strike anybody they
wanted to."8 3 Thejudge then denied the motion, reasoning that the
fair cross-section requirement applies only to the selection of the
venire panel and not to the petit jury itself.84
On appeal, Batson argued that the prosecutor's use of peremp-
tory challenges violated his right-under the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and under Section Eleven of the
Kentucky Constitution-to ajury drawn from a cross section of the
community.85 He also asserted that the prosecutor had engaged in
a "pattern" of discriminatory challenges that established an equal
protection violation under Swain.8 6 The Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and observed that it had recently 'elied on
Swain v. Alabama for the proposition that a defendant who alleges
lack of a fair cross section must show that the prosecutor systemati-
cally excluded a group of jurors from the venire8 7 The court con-
cluded that Batson had not demonstrated systematic exclusion.88
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case.8 9 The Court noted that the Kentucky trial court flatly rejected
77 Batson, 476 U.S. at 82.
78 Id. at 83.
79 Id. at 82-83.
80 Id. at 83.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. Batson conceded that Swain v. Alabama foreclosed an equal protection claim
based solely on the prosecutor's conduct in the instant case. He urged the Kentucky
Supreme Court to follow the decisions of other states. Id.
86 Id. at 83-84.
87 Id. at 84.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 100.
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Batson's objection to the prosecutor's removal of all African-Ameri-
cans on the venire without first requiring the prosecutor to explain
his action.90 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause for-
bids the prosecutor from challenging jurors solely because of their
race or on the assumption that African-American jurors will be un-
able to consider impartially the State's case against an African-
American defendant. 91
The Court further held that to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury, the de-
fendant must satisfy a three-part test.92 First, the defendant must
show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group. 93 Second,
the defendant must establish that the prosecutor exercised peremp-
tory challenges to remove members of the defendant's race from the
venire panel.94 Finally, the defendant must produce facts and any
other relevant circumstances which raise an inference that the pros-
ecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude the venire persons
from the petit jury because of their race.95 Once the defendant
makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the state to offer a
race-neutral reason for challenging the African-American jurors. 96
The prosecutor may not rebut a prima facie showing by stating that
he challenged the jurors on the assumption that they would be par-
tial to the defendant merely because of their shared race.97 Nor may
the prosecutor simply affirm that he challenged individual jurors in
good faith. 98 The prosecutor must provide a race-neutral reason for
the challenge that is "clear and reasonably specific." 99
The Court also reaffirmed the principle announced in Strauder
v. West Virginia: a state denies an African-American defendant equal
protection when it tries the defendant before a jury from which
members of the defendant's race have been discriminatorily ex-
cluded.100 The Batson Court noted, however, that a defendant has
90 Id.
91 Id. at 89.
92 Id. at 96.
93 Ida
94 Id.
[Tihe defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."
IE (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953) (holding unconstitutional a state
practice of printing names of Caucasian and African-American venire persons on paper
of different colors so that African-Americans would never be called)).
95 Id. at 96.
96 Id. at 97.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 98.
99 Id. at 98 n.20.
100 Id. at 85-90.
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no affirmative right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of his own race.' 0 1 The Equal Protection Clause simply
guarantees the defendant that the state will not exclude members of
the defendant's race from the venire on the basis of race or on the
erroneous assumption that members of the defendant's race are not
qualified to serve as jurors. 102 By denying a venire person participa-
tion injury service because of race, the state also unconstitutionally
discriminates against the excluded juror.103 Moreover, selection
procedures that purposefully exclude African-American jurors from
venire panels and juries undermine public confidence in the system
of justice. 104
The Court overruled that portion of Swain v. Alabama concern-
ing the defendant's evidentiary burden.10 5 The Swain Court had
held that an African-American defendant could make out a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that, in
case after case, the prosecutor had challenged African-American ve-
nire persons.' 0 6 The Batson Court held that this evidentiary formu-
lation conflicted with the equal protection standards developed in
decisions relating to the selection of the jury venire.10 7 Thus, after
Batson, a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful
racial discrimination in the venire panel selection based solely on
the facts of that particular defendant's case. 0 8
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, asserted that Strauder v.
West Virginia 109 "laid the foundation for the Court's unceasing ef-
forts to eradicate racial discrimination"' 10 from the process of se-
lecting the petit jury, which "has occupied a central position in our
system ofjustice.""' He affirmed that "[a] person's race simply 'is
101 Id. at 85 n.6.
102 Id. at 86.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 87-88.
105 Id. at 100 n.25.
106 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222-24 (1965).
107 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977)
(holding that the defendant may establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury
selection by proving that in the particularjurisdiction members of his race have not been
summoned for jury service over an extended period of time); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976) (holding that circumstantial evidence of disproportionate im-
pact may, for all practical purposes, prove unconstitutional discrimination); Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629-31 (1972) (holding that once the defendant establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection, the burden shifts to the State to
explain adequately the racial exclusion)).
108 Id
109 Id. at 85-88.
110 Id. at 85.
111 Id. at86.
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unrelated to his fitness as a juror.' "112 Furthermore, "[t]he harm
from discriminatory jury selection... touch[es] the entire commu-
nity... [and] undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness of our
system ofjustice."113 In addition, "[d]iscrimination within the judi-
cial system is most pernicious because it is 'a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [black citizens] that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.' "114 Finally,
"[i]n view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be
strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race." 115
Thus, the Batson decision both established the procedure for
challenging the racially motivated exclusion of a juror and affirmed
the doctrinal foundation of peremptory challenge analysis. A defen-
dant, armed with Batson's three-part test, can more easily prove pur-
poseful discrimination in the selection of the venire panel. More
importantly, the principles in Batson assure that the courts will safe-
guard the defendant's right to ajury selected in a race-neutral fash-
ion.16 Powell's argument is not simply a technical one that
establishes procedures for proper jury selection. His opinion, like
Justice Strong's in Strauder, firmly locates these procedures in the
panoply of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. 117
4. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. (1991)118
Extending the Batson rationale to civil suits, the Court in Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co. held that a private litigant in a civil case
may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors because of
race.' 9 Thus, the decision in Edmonson, when combined with the
Court's recent holding in Powers v. Ohio, 120 stands for the proposi-
112 Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (holding that intentional exclusion of persons who work for a daily
wage from a jury panel violated federal and state law)).
113 Id
114 Id. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (brack-
ets in original)).
115 Id. at 99.
116 Id at 87-88. One commentator has suggested that "[a]rguably Batson's force, if
any, will lie in the deterrence effect it will have upon prosecutors." Brian Wilson, Note,
Batson v. Kentucky: Can the "New" Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection of Strauder
v. West Virginia?, 20 AKRON L. REv. 355, 364 (1986).
117 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89-90.
118 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
119 Id. at 2080.
120 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991) (holding that the party objecting to an allegedly race-
based peremptory challenge need not be of the same race as the challenged juror).
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tion that "both sides, in all civil jury cases, no matter what their race
... may lodge racial challenge objections."' 12 1
Edmonson, an African-American construction worker, sued
Leesville Concrete Company in District Court, alleging that Lees-
ville's negligence had injured him in a job-site accident. 122 Edmon-
son invoked his Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. 123
During voir dire, Leesville used two of its three peremptory chal-
lenges authorized by statute to remove African-Americans from the
venire panel. 124 Edmonson requested that the court require Lees-
ville to articulate a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory
strikes. 125 The court refused on the ground that Batson did not ap-
ply in civil proceedings. 126 The impaneled jury, consisting of eleven
whites and one African-American, rendered a verdict for Edmon-
son, assessing his total damages at $90,000.127 The jury attributed
80% of the fault to Edmonson's contributory negligence, however,
and awarded him only $18,000.128
On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that Batson applies to a private attorney
and that peremptory challenges may not be used in a civil suit for
the purpose of excluding jurors on the basis of race. 129 The panel
remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether Edmonson
had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Bat-
121 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia assumes that Edmonson
"logically must apply to criminal prosecutions." Id. at 2095. He is correct. The Court
recently decided that very question. In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court held that Batson
applies to a criminal defendant's use of race-based peremptory challenges. 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992). Once the state action hurdle is overcome, Batson logically applies to all
participants in all jury trials. Id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., concurring);
see E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Bat-
son v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM L. REV. 355, 365-68 (1988) (arguing that discriminatory
peremptory challenges by either side should be disallowed). But see Katherine Gold-
wasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury
in a Criminal Trial, 102 HnAv. L. REV. 808, 809-11 (1989) (concluding that Batson restric-
tions on prosecutorial peremptory challenges should not be extended to defendant's use
of peremptory challenges).
For step-by-step instructions on how to make a Batson challenge in a civil trial, see
Erskine D. McIntosh, The Defense Counsel's Guide to Understanding and Challenging Racially
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges in Connecticut under Batson v. Kentucky, 11 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 31 (1990); Bradley D. Souders, Thomas v. Diversified Contractors:
Everything the Civil Practitioner Wants to Know About Batson, But Is Afraid to Ask, 13 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 925 (1989).
122 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
123 Id. at 2080-8 1.
124 Id. at 2081.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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son. 130 The full court then ordered a rehearing en banc. A divided en
banc panel affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that a
private litigant in a civil suit may exercise peremptory challenges
without accountability for alleged racial classifications. 13 1 The
United States Supreme Court reversed and held that Batson restric-
tions on the use of peremptory challenges also apply to civil
litigants.'3 2
In order to apply the Equal Protection Clause, the Court had to
determine first whether Leesville's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges constituted state action.133 The Court held that such chal-
lenges satisfy the two-part state action test. 134 The first part of the
test asks "whether the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted
from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state
authority."' 135 Peremptory challenges, the Court observed, satisfy
the first part of the test13 6 because peremptory challenges are per-
mitted only when the government, by statute or decisional law, al-
lows parties to exclude a given number of venire persons who would
otherwise satisfy the requirements for jury service.' 3 7
The second part of the test asks "whether a private litigant in all
fairness must be deemed a government actor in the use of peremp-
tory challenges."' 38 The Court held that peremptory challenges
satisfy the second part of the test'3 9 because Leesville made exten-
sive use of "government procedures" with the government's "overt,
significant assistance."'140 Peremptory challenges, the Court rea-
soned, have no use outside the jury trial system, which is an elabo-
rate set of statutory provisions that government officials
administer.' 4 ' The trial judge, who is a government actor, exercises
substantial control over voir dire and effects the final and practical
denial of the excluded juror's opportunity to serve on the jury. 142
In addition, the Court asserted that "[t]he peremptory challenge is
130 Id.
131 Id.; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990).
132 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89.
133 Standing was also an issue. The Court held that a private civil litigant may raise
the equal protection claim of a person whom the opposing party has excluded from jury
service on account of race. The civil context satisfies all three requirements for third-
party standing. Id at 2087-88.
134 Id. at 2082-83; see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).
'35 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
136 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
137 Id. at 2082-83; see 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
138 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
139 Id.; see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42.
140 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084 (citing Tula Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988)).
141 Id at 2084-87.
142 Id at 2084.
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used in selecting [the jury,] an entity that is a quintessential govern-
mental body, having no attributes of a private actor."'' 4 Finally, the
Court concluded that the courtroom is a "real expression of the
constitutional authority of the government" and "[tlo permit racial
exclusion in this official forum compounds the racial insult inherent
in judging a citizen by the color of his or her skin."' 144
As in Batson, the Court in Edmonson identified racial discrimina-
tion as both a judicial and a societal problem. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Kennedy observed that "[i]f our society is to continue
to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the
automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and
causes continued hurt and injury."' 145 Furthermore, Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that "[r]ace discrimination within the courtroom
raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings con-
ducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system
and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a
reality."'146 Finally, Justice Kennedy urged that "the quiet rational-
ity of the courtroom" made it an ideal place to confront "race-based
fears."1 47
III
PosT-BATSON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Concurring in Batson, Justice Marshall wrote that post-Batson
prosecutors are still free to discriminate "provided that they hold
that discrimination to an 'acceptable' level. ' 148 Consequently, a
reason for juror exclusion that is grounded largely in speculation
rather than in facts uncovered during voir dire permits discrimina-
tory practices to continue. 149 Thus, federal courts after Batson face a
143 Id. at 2085.
144 Id. at 2087.
145 Id. at 2088.
"[R]acial discrimination in the qualification or selection ofjurors offends
the dignity of persons and the integrity of the courts."
Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991)).
146 Id. at 2087.
147 Id. at 2088.
148 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105.
An example of an "acceptable level" of discrimination is an explanation that ap-
pears facially neutral but has a disparate impact on members of the defendant's racial or
ethnic group. Such an explanation is "inherently suspect." People v. Hemandez, 552
N.E.2d 621, 627 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting) (quoting BrianJ. Serr & Mark Maney,
Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance,
79J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 54 (1988)).
149 See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988)
(holding that state's explanation for use of its peremptories to challenge four African-
Americans from the venire panel was insufficient); Gamble v. State, 357 S.E.2d 792 (Ga.
1987) (holding that the prosecutor failed to rebut the defendant's prima facie showing
of a discriminatory peremptory challenge); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (NJ.
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practical problem: the Batson test permits the exclusion of venire
persons for speculative and often discriminatory reasons, such as
"intuition," "body language," and "demeanor." Yet fidelity to the
Fourteenth Amendment should require the proscription of reasons
that are not only facially discriminatory, but are also reasonably
likely to be discriminatory, such as "intuition" or "appearance."' 150
As this Note will show, the Court's most recent examination of a
soft-data peremptory challenge compromises the demands of the
Equal Protection Clause as well as the principles articulated over
one hundred years ago in Strauder v. West Virginia.15'
In addition to these practical constitutional problems inherent
in the Batson test, theoretical problems also exist. The decision in
Batson v. Kentucky represents a profound alteration of the role of the
peremptory challenge in a jury trial.' 52 Traditionally beyond the
scope of judicial scrutiny, the post-Batson peremptory challenge is
no longer the sole prerogative of an attorney. The decision aggra-
vated the philosophical tension between the "very old creden-
tials"' 153 of the peremptory challenge and the dictates of the
Constitution. Indeed, one New York State Court of Appeals judge
expressed "the very profound difficulties involved in reconciling a
1986) (holding that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were improperly based on
group bias); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 21.3 (Supp. 1989).
Marshall's dissent in Batson suggests that racism exists even in prosecutorial
intuition:
[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to
convince himself that his motives are legal. A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a pro-
spective black juror is "sullen," or "distant," a characterization that
would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically. A
judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept
such an explanation as well supported .... [P]rosecutors' peremptories
are based on their "seat-of-the-pants instincts" ....Yet "seat-of-the-
pants instincts" may often be just another term for racial prejudice.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (citations omitted).
One study recently indicated how racial discrimination can occur even among white
persons apparently strongly opposed to racial discrimination. Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317 (1987). Lawrence concluded that "[r]acism continues to be aided and abetted by
self-conscious bigots and well-meaning liberals alike." Id. at 387.
Professor Johnson's work confirms the prevalence of white jury prejudice against
African-American defendants. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury,
83 MiCH. L. REv. 1611, 1634-35 (1985) (summarizing a study showing that white stu-
dents were more likely to convict a black man of rape when the victim was white than
when the victim was black).
150 Justice Stevens suggests that there is no bright line dividing discriminatory pur-
pose from impact. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1876 & n.1 (1991). That is,
disparate impact can sometimes be evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1876.
151 See infra part III.A.
152 See infra note 154.
153 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
juror challenge system that is theoretically based on the attorney's
inexplicable personal hunch with a constitutional rule that requires
attorneys to offer satisfactory 'neutral' explanations for their
choices." 1 54 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court re-
cently attempted to reconcile these competing forces in Hernandez v.
New York.
A. Hernandez v. New York (1991) 155
Less than a week before the Court decided Edmonson v. Leesville,
the Court evaluated a prosecutor's proffered reasons for a peremp-
tory challenge under a Batson analysis. In Hernandez v. New York, the
Court upheld the prosecutor's exclusion of bilingual Latino venire
persons on the ground that the potential jurors would be unable to
accept the interpreter's translation of witness testimony.1 56
Prior to trial and after the voir dire examination of sixty-three
jurors had been completed and nine jurors had been selected, the
defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges in excusing four potential jurors with Latino sur-
names. 157 Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.' 58 Without wait-
ing for a ruling on whether Hernandez had established a prima facie
case of discrimination under Batson, the prosecutor volunteered his
reasons for striking two of the jurors, Munoz and Rivera. According
to the prosecutor, each juror had a brother who had been prose-
cuted by the same District Attorney's office. In the prosecutor's
opinion, these jurors could not be fair in the deliberations on the
case.' 59 The prosecutor further explained that he had challenged
the other two jurors, Mikus and Gonzalez, because they had given
him a basis to believe, through words and actions, that their Spanish
language fluency might hinder their ability to accept the official
court interpreter's translation of the testimony of Spanish-speaking
witnesses.' 60 He explained that they "looked away" from him and
responded "with some hesitancy" when asked whether they would
follow the official interpreter's version of the testimony.16 ' The case
was tried with no Latino jurors, and the defendant was convicted. 162
154 See People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J., concur-
ring). Many have used this argument as support for the proposition that peremptory
challenges should be abolished. See supra note 76.
155 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
156 Id. at 1873.
157 Id. at 1864.
158 Id. at 1865.
159 People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990).
160 Id.
161 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1864-65.
162 Id. at 1865.
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The New York Appellate Division and the New York Court of Ap-
peals both affirmed.163
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'6 to de-
cide whether the prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons for chal-
lenging potential Latino jurors and, if so, whether the state court's
decision to accept the prosecutor's explanation should be sus-
tained.1 65 Writing for a four-member plurality, Justice Kennedy
held that the prosecutor did offer a race-neutral basis for his per-
emptory challenges and that the state court conviction should be
affirmed. 166
The Court applied Batson's three-part test for evaluating an ob-
jection to peremptory challenges.167 Since the prosecutor had of-
fered an explanation for the peremptory challenges, 168 and the trial
court had ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimina-
tion, a prima facie showing of discrimination was unnecessary.' 69
The second issue concerned the facial validity of the prosecutor's
explanation, which had to be race-neutral to satisfy the Batson
test.' 70 The Court held that while the prosecutor's criterion for ex-
clusion-whether jurors might have difficulty in accepting the trans-
lator's rendition of the Spanish-language testimony-might have
resulted in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino ju-
rors, that criterion was not proof of the racially discriminatory intent
or purpose that is required to show a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.' 71 The Court asserted that it need not address Her-
nandez's argument that Spanish-speaking ability bears such a close
relation to ethnicity that exercising a peremptory challenge on the
former ground violates equal protection. 72 The prosecutor ex-
plained that the jurors' specific responses and demeanor, and not
their language proficiency alone, caused him to doubt their ability to
defer to the official translation.'73 The Court stated that although a
high percentage of bilingual jurors might hesitate before answering
questions like those asked during voir dire and, therefore, would be
excluded under the prosecutor's criterion would not cause the crite-
163 Id.
164 Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990).
165 Hernandez, 11 S. Ct. at 1864.
166 Id. at 1873.
167 Id. at 1865-66.
168 Id. at 1864-65. The prosecutor stated that he did not think that the venire per-
sons would accept the interpreter's translation of testimony spoken in Spanish. Id.
169 Id. at 1866.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1867-68.
172 Id. at 1866-67.
173 Id. at 1867.
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rion to fail the race-neutrality test.174 The Court also stated that a
decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent repre-
sents a finding of fact accorded great deference on appeal. 175
Therefore, the trial court did not commit clear error in determining
that the prosecutor did not discriminate on the basis of the Latino
jurors' ethnicity. 176
The Court, however, based its decision on an incorrect assump-
tion that was never discussed. 177 The prosecutor did not ask every
potential juror whether accepting the interpreter's translation would
be difficult. 178 The prosecutor only asked the four jurors with La-
tino surnames about language difficulties.' 7 9 Furthermore, in apply-
ing the Batson test, the Hernandez Court asked only whether the
prosecutor's reason evinced a facially discriminatory motive. 180
Since no such motive was apparent, the Court upheld the challenges
to the jurors. 18 '
The impact of Hernandez v. New York is two-fold. First, the deci-
sion reduces the Batson analysis to a superficial check only for the
most egregious forms of discrimination. As Justice Marshall wrote
in dissent, "[i]f any explanation, no matter how insubstantial and no
matter how great its disparate impact, could rebut a prima facie in-
ference of discrimination provided only that the explanation itself
was not facially discriminatory, 'the Equal Protection Clause would
be but a vain and illusory requirement.' "182 Since racism toward
African-Americans is most often hidden and subjective, 18 the Her-
nandez Court's application of the Batson test is little more than an
empty gesture toward equal protection.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1868-69. See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986).
176 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1871-72.
177 Id. at 1867.
As explained by the prosecutor, the challenges rested neither on the in-
tention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical as-
sumptions about Latinos or bilinguals. The prosecutor's articulated basis
for these challenges divided potential jurors into two classes: those
whose conduct during voir dire would persuade him they might have dif-
ficulty in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish-language testi-
mony and those potential jurors who gave no such reason for doubt.
Each category would include both Latinos and non-Latinos.
Id.
178 People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. 1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 622.
180 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1866-68.
181 Id. at 1873.
182 Id at 1876 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98
(1986)).
183 This is of course also true for other minorities, but since the peremptory chal-
lenge cases have overwhelmingly involved African-Americans, it seems appropriate to
focus on that group as the primary target of such discrimination.
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Second, the Hernandez analysis provides the lower federal courts
with little guidance in assessing an attorney's proffered reason for a
peremptory challenge, since virtually any reason would satisfy the
Hernandez application of the Batson test.18 4 Courts are thus in a diffi-
cult position: in a Batson challenge, ajudge must ask an attorney for
a race-neutral explanation, but once the attorney offers such a rea-
son-whether based on intuition or not-the judge must accept it as
long as it does not appear discriminatory on its face. Federal courts
have struggled unsuccessfully to apply this amorphous and confus-
ing test.
B. Federal Courts of Appeals Application of Batson
Virtually all federal circuit courts analyzing a Batson challenge
have encountered problems with the three-part test. A recent com-
puter search 8 5 revealed that since Batson, defendants in seventy-six
cases established prima facie instances of discriminatory peremptory
challenges, thus requiring a district court judge to evaluate the at-
torneys' proffered race-neutral reasons for the suspect chal-
lenges.' 8 6 Fourteen were reversed on appeal, but in nine of these
184 See supra note 182.
185 WESTIAW search conducted November 20, 1991, and updated in October,
1992. Database: ALLFEDS. Query: 230K33(5.1).
186 United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Guerra-
Marez, 928 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valley, 928 F.2d 130 (5th Cir.
1991); United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989
(1992); United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
907 (1992); United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Miller, 939 F.2d 605 (8th Cir. 1991);Jones v.Jones, 938 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1991); Reyn-
olds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991); United
States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v.Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102
(10th Cir. 1991); Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1516 (1992); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1279 (1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991); Love v.
Jones, 923 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748 (11th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1102 (1991); United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ruiz,
894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990); Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Castille v. Harrison, 111 S. Ct. 568 (1990); United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211 (5th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2264 (1991); United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991); United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168
(6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Usman v. U.S., 111 S. Ct. 173 (1990); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1137 (1991); United States v. Matha, 915 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.,
Guifflida v. U.S., 111 S. Ct. 971 (1991); United States v.Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir.
1990); United States v. Thomas, 914 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hughes,
911 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson, 905 F.2d 222 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 304 (1990); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 960 F.2d 1433 (1992); United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1990);
Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2263
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cases Batson had not yet been decided and are, therefore, irrelevant
for this discussion. 187 Of the remaining five cases, two may also be
discounted.18 8 Thus, in only three of the seventy-six cases have fed-
eral circuit courts, applying the Batson test, found that the attorney's
race-neutral reasons were pretextual, requiring reversal.' 8 9
(1991); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mitch-
ell, 877 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989);
United States v. Nicholson, 885 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Power, 881
F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988);
United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069
(1990); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Tucker, 836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1989); United States v.
David, 844 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.
1987); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Jones v. Garrett,
484 U.S. 898 (1987); United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 928 (1987); United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302
(10th Cir. 1987).
187 These nine cases applied the Swain test at the trial court level: Horton v. Zant,
941 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992); Love v.Jones, 923
F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1991); Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 568 (1990); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1337 (1991); United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987); Garrett v. Morris, 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987); United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983 (1988).
Five cases applied the Batson test at the trial court level: Splunge v. Clark, 960 F.2d
705 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); United States
v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989).
188 One of the other two cases was reversed for a defective Batson hearing held in
camera without defense counsel. United States v. Alcantar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.
1990). Thus, the court never fully considered the explanations themselves. Id. at 440.
See generally Hopper, supra note 76, at 835-36 (ex parte in camera proceedings freeze
analysis of Batson claims in their infancy); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Note, Defense Presence and
Participation: A Procedural Minimum for Batson v. Kentucky Hearings, 99 YALE L.J. 187
(1989) (arguing that defense should be present during a prosecutor's in camera recita-
tion of a race-neutral explanation).
The remaining case was reversed for the use of gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges. United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States
v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) (holding
that Batson analysis does not apply in cases in which gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges are used). See generally, Jere W. Morehead, Exploring the Frontiers of Batson v. Ken-
tucky: Should the Safeguards of Equal Protection Extend to Gender?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
289 (1990) (arguing that Batson protection should extend to gender-based challenges);
Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptoy Challenges, 105 HARv. L. REV.
1920 (1992) (same).
In the remaining three cases, federal courts of appeals reversed district court find-
ings of attorneys' all neutral exercise of peremptory challenges. Splunge v. Clark, 960
F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1989).
189 Splunge, 960 F.2d at 705; Bishop, 959 F.2d at 820; Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 695. In
Chinchilla, the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude one Hispanic be-
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The lawyers' stated reasons for challenges in these seventy-six
cases focused consistently on certain qualities of potential jurors:
prior involvement with the law, prosecutorial intuition, body lan-
guage and appearance, employment o90 and residence, knowledge of
the defendant, and age. 19' Less popular reasons included the gen-
der, education, or background of the venire person; a non-tradi-
tional living arrangement; 192 and the inability to defer to the
courtroom translator. There is, however, no consensus among the
circuits about the validity of these reasons or how to analyze
them.19 3
In some circuits, many of these reasons are pretextual while in
others they are unimpeachable.' 94 In addition, one circuit holds a
cause of age, residence, and type of employment. 874 F.2d at 698-99. The court ob-
served that the presence of seated African-Americans jurors weighed against a prima
fade case of discrimination. Id. at 698 nA. The court also stated that the prosecutor's
reasons for excluding the Hispanic were pretextual, since unchallenged jurors lived in
the same area as the stricken juror, and ages of other jurors were not known. Id. at 699.
Based upon these factors, the court applied the Batson test. Id at 697. In Splunge, the
attorney struck one African-American juror because the State had "feelings ... that she
would not be a good juror." 960 F.2d at 708. In the last case, Bishop, 959 F.2d at 822,
the prosecutor struck one African-American juror who lived in a low-income housing
project. The prosecutor stated that the juror probably thought that the police "pick on
black people." Id.
190 According to one writer, occupation ranks as "extremely important" in evaluat-
ingjurors. ROBERT A. WENRE, THE ART OF SELECTING AJuRY 64, 71 (2d ed. 1989). But
see Spence, The Dynamics of Identification in Jury Selection or How You Lost Your Last Case
Without Even Knowing It: A New Approach to Voir Dire Examination, in JuRY SELECTION TECH-
NIQUES 60, 68 (G. Cooper ed., 1981) (arguing that ajuror's employment may not reveal
anything about whether a juror favors the plaintiff or defendant).
Related to occupation is income. One article argues that low income jurors em-
pathize with civil plaintiffs, whereas wealthy jurors favor civil defendants. BILL COLSON
ET AL., JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE §§ 7.06-.07 (1986).
191 In many cases, the prosecutor states that the combination of several of these
traits present in one juror render thatjuror unsuitable for service. See, e.g., United States
v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243 (1lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279 (1992) (prosecu-
tor had convicted an unrelated defendant who lived in the same area as the juror);
United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989)
(juror's brother convicted on unrelated case, slovenly appearance, juror present on
prior jury that acquitted unrelated defendant); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695
(9th Cir. 1989) (age, residence, and type of employment); United States v. Clemons, 843
F.2d 741 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835 (1988) (age, hairstyle, and dress); United
States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988) (lack of eye contact, body lan-
guage, age, same last name as someone previously convicted); United States v. Tucker,
836 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1988) (juror lacked education and
business experience).
192 See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 989 (1992) (illegal cohabitation by juror; another juror was living with her fiance);
United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1991) (juror was a young single
mother who "might have other concerns").
193 For a good summary of the stances of several circuits, see Clemons, 843 F.2d at
746-47.
194 See supra note 188 (discussing circuit split on treatment of gender based reasons).
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prosecutor's race-neutral reasons pretextual if the prosecutor fails
to strike potential jurors who have the same traits or qualities as
stricken jurors. 195 In other circuits, such a disparity is not disposi-
tive of the issue.196 If one or more minority jurors are already
seated or if the attorney has not used all of her challenges to strike
only minorities, establishing a prima fade case of discriminatory
challenges will be more difficult. 197 Some circuits uphold chal-
lenges based on vague assurances from the attorney that the back-
ground of the venire member is objectionable.1 98 In Garrett v.
Morris,199 however, the Eighth Circuit held the very same reasons
pretextual. 200
In some cases, federal circuit courts simply misapply the Batson
test. In Jones v. Jones,20 1 for example, the Eighth Circuit asserted that
the challenge is acceptable as long as the reasons offered are "not
frivolous." In addition, the court held that, once the attorney pro-
vides reasons for the challenge, the burden of proof reverts to the
adverse party to show that the offered reasons are pretextual. 20 2
Batson, however, does not require that the burden of proof revert to
the adverse party after the prosecutor offers a race-neutral reason
for the challenge. 20 3 In fact, one court observed that, once a prima
facie case is established, a conviction must be reversed unless the
court finds that the prosecutor's reason qualifies as race-neutral. 20 4
Another court declared that the reasons need not be "quantifi-
able," 20 5 yet Batson clearly requires that the reasons for the chal-
lenge be "clear and reasonably specific." 20 6 Additionally, several
courts have asserted that mere intuition may withstand Batson analy-
195 See Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 695; infra note 234 and accompanying text.
196 See United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Val-
ley, 928 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ferguson, 935 F.2d 862 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 907 (1992); United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548 (11th
Cir. 1991); Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2263 (1991).
197 See United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173
(1990). But see Ferguson, 935 F.2d at 862 (holding that prima facie case established re-
gardless of fact that prosecutor left one strike unused).
198 A challenge upheld because of an attorney's "intuition" is a challenge upheld for
no reason at all. See supra notes 191-92. But see Polk v. Dixie Indus. Co., 972 F.2d 83
(5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that the lack of eye contact is a pretext for racially
discriminatory motives).
199 815 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
200 Id. at 514 (rejecting prosecutor's disclaimer of racial motives).
201 938 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1991).
202 Id. at 843.
203 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
204 United States v. Matha, 915 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1990).
205 United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2275 (1991).
206 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981); see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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sis. 2 ° 7 Indeed, in United States v. Brown, the Tenth Circuit declared
that even reasons "tangentially connected with [the excluded venire
person's] race" are permissible. 20 8
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, little agreement
exists among the circuit courts about how to analyze an attorney's
allegedly race-neutral reasons for striking a venire person. These
decisions are the unruly progeny of Batson, which provided little gui-
dance for courts addressing the issue of whether an attorney's rea-
sons for a peremptory challenge are pretextual or legitimate.
Without adequate guidelines, courts reviewing peremptory chal-
lenges are unable to examine soft-data reasons, such as intuition or
traits closely linked to race, that violate the purpose and spirit of
Batson. Such soft-data reasons frequently mask an unarticulated fear
that prompts a discriminatory peremptory challenge.
The Supreme Court and federal circuit court decisions since
Batson reveal that all courts have dutiftilly adopted the three-part
test announced in Batson. In only three cases since Batson, however,
have federal appellate courts held invalid lawyers' proffered reasons
for exclusion.20 9 The disparity in the application of the Batson test
among the federal circuit courts demonstrates the difficulty of en-
forcing a standard without a clear perimeter. In addition, some
courts respect the tradition of the peremptory challenge more than
other courts. The resulting inconsistency among the circuits is un-
acceptable, since, at the very least, a party's constitutional right to a
fair trial should not vary among the circuits.
IV
A MODEST PROPOSAL
As a solution to the problem of the inconsistent application of
the Batson test, this Note offers three proposals. 2 10 First, this Note
suggests that federal courts, when applying the Batson test, should
no longer accept reasons for a peremptory challenge that are based
on soft-data. Second, this Note proposes that all explanations for
peremptory challenges must be based on jurors' written or oral
statements made during voir dire or contained in a questionnaire.
Judges would then determine whether the statements have a sub-
stantial nexus to the facts of the particular case. Third, this Note
207 United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 173
(1990); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988).
208 817 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1987).
209 See supra note 189.
210 Other solutions are possible. See generally Robert L. Harris, Jr., Note, Redefining
the Harm of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027 (1991) (arguing that ve-
nire pools ought to be more inclusive and more representative of the population at
large).
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argues that attorneys should be required to strike all jurors with the
same "unacceptable" characteristic, regardless of race.2 "
A. Eliminating Soft-data Exclusions
Soft-data reasons for peremptory challenges are improper for
several reasons. First, such reasons can mask overt and covert dis-
crimination. A prosecutor who assumes that an African-American
juror will be sympathetic to an African-American defendant and ex-
cuses that juror discriminates against both juror and defendant.
When the ostensible reason for such an exclusion is purely subjec-
tive (i.e., "body language"), it cannot be analyzed; thus, the discrim-
ination goes unchecked. Nothing prevents a prosecutor from
simply lying to the judge. In addition, soft-data reasons allow "an
attorney ... [to] lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that
his motives are legal." 212 As Justice Marshall explained, " '[s]eat-of-
the-pants instincts' may often be just another term for racial
prejudice." 213
Second, courts cannot effectively analyze reasons based on soft-
data. Subjective reasons are simply unimpeachable. Justice Mar-
shall observed that "[a]ny prosecutor can easily assert facially neu-
tral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to
second-guess those reasons." 21 4 If he is correct, then the Batson test
is little more than a test of the prosecutor's creativity. Therefore, it
comes as no surprise that in only three cases have federal courts of
appeals held invalid prosecutors' stated reasons for peremptory
211 This is the position of the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d
695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989).
One judge has suggested requiring a lawyer who strikes any member of a group
cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause to explain the strike immediately. See
United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., dissenting); see
also Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination injury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 761-68 (1992) (arguing for a modified Batson test that
incorporates existing equal protection principles for race, gender, age, and other traits).
212 Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting King v. County of
Nassau, 581 F.Supp. 493, 502 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)). "A prosecutor's own conscious or un-
conscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that 'a prospective black juror is
'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a white
juror had acted identically." Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror
because the juror had a son about the same age as [the] defendant, or
seemed "uncommunicative," or "never cracked a smile" and, therefore,
"did not possess the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the is-
sues and decide the facts in this case"?
Id. (citations omitted).
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challenges. 21 5 To date, therefore, Batson has offered only "vain and
illusory" protection in a court of law.2 16
Finally, permitting soft-data exclusions suggests that the Court
is not serious about its commitment to the eradication of racism
from the courtroom. As the Strauder-Bason-Edmonson line of deci-
sions intimate, the Court apparently understands that judgments
about a venire person based on intuition, body language, and dia-
lect are often a reflection of racist assumptions. 217 If this were not
true, then the Batson test serves little purpose. If, however, the pur-
pose of Batson is to expose and eradicate racist stereotyping and dis-
crimination in the jury selection process, then soft-data exclusions,
which cloak racist peremptory challenges, must be eliminated.
Critics of this first proposal will charge that the elimination of
the "instinctive" exclusion of jurors in the Batson challenge context
represents a radical break from the traditional exercise of the per-
emptory challenge. The Court, however, already made a profound
break with tradition when it decided Batson v. Kentucky. By itself, the
Batson test ensures that peremptory challenges will be subject to ju-
dicial scrutiny when the defendant establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination in juror exclusion. The challenge is no longer be-
yond the reach of the Constitution, and it is no longer the "arbitrary
and capricious" right that Blackstone celebrated. 218 Therefore, to
propose that exclusions based on soft-data are improper represents
only a modest extension of Batson.
B. Hard-data Reasons for Exclusion and the "Substantial
Nexus" Test
This Note's second proposal has two parts. First, the exclusion
of a juror should be based on the juror's written or oral statements
made during voir dire or in a juror questionnaire. Such statements
constitute acceptable hard-data reasons for exclusions. The sev-
enty-six federal circuit court cases decided since Batson provide ex-
amples of hard-data reasons:
215 See supra note 189.
216 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
217 These cases suggest that reasons that are "tangentially related to race" are im-
proper. But see Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991). In that case, the Court
required that the prosecutor's explanation itself evidence a discriminatory motive or in-
tent. The confusion in the Hernandez case about what sort of standard the reason must
meet is yet another reason to get rid of the soft-data exclusion. Unless the prosecutor
admits that he is a racist or says something blatantly discriminatory, every reason would
pass muster. Surely Batson-and the Equal Protection Clause-stand for more than that.
See generally supra part III.A.
218 See supra note 20.
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Type and status of employment; 219
Age;220
Marital status; 22 1
Location of residence;222
Level of education; 223
Knowledge of the defendant;224
Prior jury participation in a criminal trial;225
Prior involvement with the law or crime. 226
These factors provide judges with specific and verifiable reasons for
a juror's exclusion and would thus allow them to analyze a peremp-
tory challenge effectively. Judges may add additional hard-data rea-
sons in developing a common law body of acceptable peremptory
challenges. Such a body of law is not, however, as important as the
requirement that an attorney's reasons for exclusion be based on a
juror's verifiable statements made during voir dire or in a juror
questionnaire.
Subjective soft-data such as body language, tone of voice, hair-
style, and dress would then no longer be acceptable. By denying an
attorney use of intuition as a sufficient reason for an exclusion, the
hard-data requirement forces the attorney to articulate an objective
reason for the challenge. The requirement also obligates the judge
to examine the juror's responses to questions for support of the per-
emptory challenge, thereby limiting the peremptory challenge to
particular facts within the trial judge's actual knowledge. 227
Second, a judge conducting such an examination should deter-
mine whether there is a substantial nexus between the juror's state-
ments during voir dire and the specific facts of the case. This final
test for the acceptability of a juror necessitates a judge's active su-
pervision of jury selection. Indeed, the third part of the Batson test
anticipates such a judicial role.228 For example, in United States v.
Bishop, the Ninth Circuit correctly disallowed an attorney's peremp-
tory challenge that was based on the attorney's assumption that a
juror's residence in a low-income, predominantly African-American
neighborhood would bias the juror.229 The attorney asserted that
219 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
227 It also will help address a judge's conscious or unconscious racism. Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
228 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
229 959 F.2d 820, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the juror probably believed that the police "pick on" African-Ameri-
cans and would therefore be biased against the state.230 Of course,
residence in a particular neighborhood could have a substantial
nexus with the facts of the case if, for example, the juror lived near
the crime scene or the defendant.231 In Bishop, however, there was
no such nexus. 23 2 Thus, the substantial nexus test requires active
judicial supervision of a lawyer's peremptory challenges and there-
fore effectively limits a lawyer's opportunities for improper
discrimination.
Critics of this second proposal will charge that the hard-data
requirement merely replaces one set of discriminatory reasons with
another. In other words, reasons such as "level of education" or
location of residence can be used just as discriminatorily as body
language or intuition. There are three responses to this criticism.
First, the juror statement-on which the attorney's explanation is
based-must have a substantial nexus to potential bias. Such a re-
quirement nullifies an explanation based on the group bias argu-
ment criticized in Batson. Second, the goal of this proposal is not to
eliminate all discrimination in the judiciary system.233 Such a quest
would be quixotic. Rather this proposal strives to restrict the ability
of an attorney to discriminate when selecting a jury for trial. The
hard-data proposal accomplishes that. Third, the hard-data test
forces an attorney to answer the question: "Why am I striking this
juror?" This self-questioning may well lead to an examination of
the assumptions that one race has about another. An attorney who
cannot specifically and objectively answer the question with legiti-
mate factors must accept the juror.
C. The Requirement of "Comparability"
In addition to the adoption of the "hard-data" and "substantial
nexus" tests, this Note proposes that the attorney who exercises the
suspect exclusion must also challenge all jurors with the same trait
or quality, regardless of race. For example, if an African-American
230 Id at 822.
231 "Residence, as it were, often acts as an ethnic badge." Id. at 828. The Court in
Bishop lists several articles that deal with residence and race. Id.
232 Id at 825-26.
233 Because discrimination cannot be otherwise eliminated from the courtroom,
some writers advocate the total elimination of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Batson,
476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring); VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 167-69; Theo-
dore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise Unfulfilled, 58
UMKC L. Rv. 361 (1990); BrentJ. Gurney, Note, The Casefor Abolishing Peremptory Chal-
lenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227 (1986); Mintz, supra note 76, at
1026; Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1013
(1989). But see Babcock, supra note 4, at 553 (approving peremptory challenges because
it "avoids trafficking in the core of truth in most common stereotypes").
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juror is challenged because of the location of her home, the attorney
would be required to challenge all jurors who live in that area. This
requirement of comparability is necessary to ensure that hard-data
reasons offered against African-American jurors are also used to ex-
clude all jurors with the same traits. 234 Attorneys who know that
they must strike all jurors with the same trait will exercise peremp-
tory challenges circumspectly. Such an attorney might be willing to
allow minority jurors to be seated whom she would otherwise chal-
lenge peremptorily. From the attorney's perspective, it must be bet-
ter to seat one unfavorable juror than to exclude several favorable
jurors.
V
APPLICATION OF THE "HARD DATA"/"SUBSTANrIAL
NEXUS" PROPOSAL
Applying the proposal herein described, Hernandez v. New
York 235 was wrongly decided.23 6 In that case, the prosecutor exer-
cised his peremptory challenges to dismiss two venire persons with
Latino surnames. 237 The prosecutor stated that he had doubts,
based on the jurors' demeanor, that they would defer to the court-
appointed translator.238 The Court upheld the exclusions of these
two jurors, asserting that there was no discriminatory intent inher-
ent in the prosecutor's explanation. 239
If the facts of Hernandez were subject to the hard-data proposal,
the prosecutor would not have been permitted to rely on the de-
meanor of the jurors as justification for the challenge. Absent ad-
missions by the jurors that they would not defer to the courtroom
translator, no peremptory challenge would have been allowed. De-
meanor allegedly indicating a lack of willingness to defer to the offi-
cial translator constitutes an impermissible soft-data reason.
The other two challenged jurors, excluded because each had
brothers whom the District Attorney's Office had prosecuted,240
234 See Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding peremp-
tory challenge of venire person with same surname as someone previously arrested on
misdemeanor charge).
235 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); see supra part III.A.
236 Originally, Hernandez v. New York was not a federal case but a New York State
case. There is no reason to believe, however, that the United States Supreme Court
would have decided the case differently had it arisen in the federal courts. Therefore,
the application of the "hard-data" proposal to Hernandez is reasonable because it
strongly suggests what the Court would do if such a case arose in the federal courts.
237 People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 622 (N.Y. 1990); see supra notes 157-62
and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
239 Hernandez, 111 S. Ct. at 1867-68; see supra notes 164-81 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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were properly challenged. The prosecutor need only show that the
juror's statements have a substantial nexus with the facts of the case.
Such a showing would not be burdensome when the issue is prior
involvement with the prosecutor.24'
Applying the hard-data proposal to Hernandez v. New York pro-
vides a more satisfactory decision for several reasons. First, the
Court need not involve itself in the tortuous labyrinth of determin-
ing prosecutorial "intent. '242 Whether a prosecutor intended to
discriminate or not, her reasons must link the juror's statements to
the facts of the case. If a link is established the juror is dismissed; if
not, the juror remains. Second, as the Hernandez Court observed,
certain traits bear a close relation to race. For example, striking all
jurors who speak a certain language could easily be pretextual.243
Thus, the question arises whether there is a substantial nexus be-
tween language ability and the facts of the case. If the prosecutor
did not ask all jurors about their Spanish language fluency, there
can be no such nexus. In addition, because a reason such as lan-
guage fluency is "tangentially connected to race, ' 244 Batson's pro-
scription of race-based peremptory challenges would cause the
challenge to fail. Thus, bilinguals probably could not be challenged
for their dual language proficiency alone, regardless of their court-
room demeanor. 245
At the federal circuit court level, many of the seventy-six cases
previously mentioned would also have been decided differently
under the hard-data/substantial nexus proposal. Examples abound
of jurors excused for soft-data reasons: sitting with arms crossed
and appearing hostile;246 "slovenly" attired;247 eye contact and
body language;248 facial expressions and lack of strength of convic-
tions;249 inattentiveness; 250 hairstyle and dress;2 5 1 glared at defen-
241 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 167-74.
243 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
245 This Note does not suggest that a judge could not remove a juror whose de-
meanor in court clearly indicates either strong bias or resentment at being called to
serve on a jury. Such a removal would, however, be a challenge for cause and would
therefore be subject to a judge's discretion.
246 United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1987).
247 United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1028 (1989).
248 United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1988).
249 United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1990).
250 United States v. Rudas, 905 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1990).
251 United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
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dant;2 52 shabby dress; 2 53 "background"; 2 54 rubbing and rolling
eyes. 255 Absent a hard-data reason for these peremptory challenges
and a substantial nexus to the facts of the case, the jurors in the
aforementioned examples would not have been excused in the con-
text of a Batson challenge. Such an approach avoids the need for an
appeal, conserves judicial resources, and preserves the integrity of
the jury selection process.
CONCLUSION
When the challenged venire person is a member of a cognizable
class under the Equal Protection Clause, reasons for the exercise of
a peremptory challenge based on hairstyle, dress, or body language
easily conceal an attorney's covert or overt racism. Because these
soft-data reasons allow an attorney to discriminate against both the
defendant and the excluded juror, soft-data reasons for exclusion
should not be permitted in a Batson challenge.
The Court should require that an attorney's reason for a per-
emptory challenge must be an objective hard-data reason that can
be verified through a juror's actual statement during jury selection.
Forcing an attorney to articulate a hard-data reason would inhibit
discriminatory peremptory challenges because the court could bet-
ter assess the validity of the proffered reason. The substantial nexus
test then forces the judge to examine the reason critically. The po-
tential for juror partiality may suffice to exclude the juror when the
proffered reason is substantially related to the facts of the case. Fi-
nally, the requirement of comparability would encourage an attor-
ney to weigh the benefits of striking a juror of a cognizable class
when that attorney would be required to strike all jurors with that
particular hard-data trait.
Though these proposals would not eliminate all racism from
the courtroom, they represent significant progress from the ineffec-
tive and confusing Batson test. Eliminating peremptory challenges
based on soft-data protects defendants and venire persons from
overtly discriminatory peremptory challenges as well as from more
subtle and covertly racist peremptory challenges based on intuition
and demeanor. Enacting the hard-data proposal and substantial
nexus test would also demonstrate that the Batson and Edmonson
Courts' departure from traditional peremptory challenge practice
252 Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct.
2263 (1991).
253 United States v. Hughes, 911 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1990).
254 United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 983 (1988).
255 United States v. Hendrieth, 922 F.2d 748 (1 Ith Cir. 1991).
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constitutes more than a vain and illusory commitment to equal pro-
tection under the law.
Joshua E. Swiftt
t I wish to thank Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson, Patrick McCabe, and Sonali Wee-
rackody for reading and evaluating various drafts of this Note. All mistakes, however,
are my own.
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